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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction overthis appeal under Section 78-22(3)0), U.C.A. The appeal was referred to the Utah Court of Appeals under Section
78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The issue presented is whether the district court erred in granting summary
judgment for the Defendant dismissing breach of contract and waste claims by
holding the cause of action had not accrued because the element of damages had
not been shown.
The standard of review is one of correctness without deference to the legal
conclusions of the district court. Smith v. Hales & Warner Construction, Inc., 2005
Ut.App. 38,107P.3d701.
This issue was preserved for appeal in that the Defendant moved for summary
judgment on this issue and Plaintiffs filed an opposing memorandum. (R. 377,404).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
No determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, or
regulations have been identified.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE.
This is an action by joint owners of real property against a lessee for bringing

toxic substances onto the leased property. The causes of action asserted as of the
time of the summary judgment which is under appeal were for waste and breach of
contract.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.
This action was filed on October 12, 2001. The original complaint alleged

causes of action for breach of contract, waste, conversion, unjust enrichment, and
trespass. (R. 2). The original counsel withdrew a year later on October 15, 2002.
(R. 106). New counsel appeared on January 28, 2003 (R. 117).
A Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendant was considered by the court
and on July 22,2003 the court dismissed certain causes of action and left those for
trespass, breach of contract, and waste in place. (R. 237).
Another Motion for Summary Judgment was filed by the Defendant on
November 8,2004. (R. 250). Plaintiffs conceded that the trespass claim should be
dismissed. (R. 404). The court considered the remaining claims for breach of
contract and waste under the pending Motion for Summary Judgment and granted
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the same without prejudice thereby eliminating all of the pending causes of action
of the Plaintiffs as of March 8, 2005. (R. 524). See Addendum "A".
Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal on March 28, 2005. (R. 526). This appeal
was transferred by the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals on April
6,2005. (R.532).
C.

DISPOSITION OF TRIAL COURT.
The Honorable Randall N. Skanchy granted summary judgment in favor of the

Defendant thereby dismissing all causes of action of the Plaintiffs on March 8,2005.
(R. 524).
RELEVANT FACTS
The Morley T. Atkin Trust leased the gravel pit in Tooele County in January
1992 to McFarland & Hullinger, LLC for a period of 9 72 years. (R. 349). Cathy Atkin
and Patsy Atkin are daughters of Morley T. Atkin, then deceased. (R. 349). Cathy,
in turn, conveyed part of her interest to Tom Eleopulos. (R. 488).
The lease relationship went through some changes which are not relevant to
this appeal but McFarland & Hullinger retained an interest after the expiration of the
original lease for access to the property. (R. 298).
Patsy Atkin brought a partition action against her sister, Cathy Atkin, in March
of 2000 seeking to divide the property that had been leased. (R. 349). That partition
3

action has not yet been formally concluded as it left open the final drawing of
boundaries but conceptually it will result in Patsy Atkin owning the gravel pit at issue
and leave Cathy Atkin and Tom Eleopulos with the north end of the property which
does not include the gravel pit. (R. 266).
Tom Eleopulos and Cathy Atkin observed during the period of time that the
gravel pit was being regularly operated by the Defendant that rather than just gravel
going out of the facility there was truckloads of material being brought into the facility
and dumped. (R. 434). Plaintiffs began an investigation which included complaining
to the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Environmental
Quality that dark colored soils were being dumped on the property and they
suspected it would be toxic in nature. Counsel for Plaintiffs built on studies done by
the state and federal agencies by hiring an expert to evaluate the situation. That
expert determined there were some 600 truckloads of toxic materials brought into
the gravel pit with a cleanup cost of not less than $1.5 million. (R. 429, 470).
Plaintiffs claim to have incurred about $45,000.00 of expert and site study fees. (R.
484).
As the complaint shows (R. 2), Plaintiffs brought this action in an attempt to
recover damage to their interest in the property, investigation costs and cleanup
costs.
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Mention should be made of a very important fact that is not in the record.
Defendant has submitted to date no evidence or argument whatsoever in the record
that there are not toxic substances not native to the location present on the property
owned by the Plaintiffs. This is an uncontroverted fact in the current state of the
record.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellants show in this brief that all of the elements of the causes of action for
breach of contract and waste were present, including damages. The district court
erred by not recognizing the Plaintiffs had raised sufficient facts to hold a trial as to
whether damages had been incurred. The district court gave great weight to the
partition action in the same court in not finding damages but the applicable law is
that damages accrued at the time of the breach of contract and waste which all
occurred during the time Plaintiffs owned the property.
ARGUMENT
I.

INTRODUCTION
The facts and issues presented by this appeal are surprising straight forward.

The facts are that the Plaintiffs owned a gravel pit jointly with Patsy Atkin and leased
to the Defendant. A substantial quantity of toxic substances came onto the property
during the leasehold of the Defendant. Plaintiffs brought this action to recover
5

damages for the injury to the land they owned but the property was partitioned to
give Patsy Atkin the gravel pit before this lawsuit was resolved. The trial court held
that because of the partition Plaintiffs suffered no damages and a cause of action
had not accrued.
The issue for decision is whether having a land partitioned to another before
a cleanup effort was commenced by the Plaintiffs means they had no damages to
pursue. This brief shows that the elements of a claim were all in place prior to the
partition order which, in fact, is not yet finally concluded. See Addendum "B" for the
order.
II.

APPLICABLE LAW
A.

Summary Judgment Standard of Review.

In what has essentially become a legal mantra because the rule is so well
established, this court in reviewing a summary judgment, accords no deference to
the trial court and reviews the ruling for correctness. Moab Citizens Alliance v.
Grand County, 2005 Ut. App. 323, 530 Utah. Adv. Rep. 20. Rule 56, governing
summary judgments, by its very terms provides that summary judgment is not
appropriate where there is a genuine issue of material fact. Put in the context of this
case, summary judgment should not have been awarded if Plaintiffs can show
sufficient facts to support that they did incur damages.
6

B.

Accrual.

Perhaps no legal principle is more fundamental than one may bring a cause
of action only upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the
elements of the cause of action. Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1981).
Questions of accrual of the cause of action often come up in the context of
consideration of statutes of limitations. For example, in Colosmio v. Roman Catholic
Bishop of Salt Lake City, 2004 Ut. App. 436, 104 P.3d 646, this court gave an
extensive analysis of when a cause of action accrues for consideration of application
of a statute of limitations. The court explained that there must be a wrong done to
the plaintiff and the plaintiff must know or reasonably should know of that wrong.
In a contract action, this court has recognized that a cause of action accrues
when a contract has been breached. Clarke v. Living Scriptures, Inc., 2005 Ut. App.
225,114 P.3d 602. In reaching that conclusion, the Utah Court of Appeals followed
S&G, Inc. v. Intermountain Power Agency, 913 P.2d 735 (Utah 1996) and Butcher
v. Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311 (Utah App. 1987). Both of those cases held that a contract
action accrues at the time of breach. Clarke at footnote 1, mentions that Clarke had
not suffered damages at the time his contract was breached but the court said the
cause of action had still accrued under existing case law.
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This court has earlier made clear what constitutes the elements of a breach
of contract action. The court stated in Campbell, Maack & Sessions v. DeBry, 2001
Ut. App. 397, 38 P.3d 984, that the elements of a prima facie case for breach of
contract are (1) a contract, (2) performance by the party seeking recovery, (3) breach
of the contract by the other party and, (4) damages. The damages available for a
breach of contract include general contract damages and consequential damages
so as to place the aggrieved party in the same economic position he would have
been in if the contract had been performed. Kraatz v. Heritage Imports, 2003 Ut.
App. 201,71 P.3d188.
C.

Damages.

As explained above, damages are one of the basic elements of a cause of
action for breach of contract. In Black v. Allstate Insurance Company, 2004 Ut. 66,
100 P.3d 1163, the Utah Supreme Court considered the breach of a settlement
agreement and the damages available for breach of contract. The court there
recognized the general rule that breach of contract gives rise to general damages
or those flowing naturally from the breach and consequential damages.
Consequential damages are those reasonably within the contemplation or
reasonably foreseeable by the parties at the time the contract was made.
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The question of damages is generally one of fact for the jury. Aspenwoods,
LLC v. CAT., LLC, 2003 Ut. App. 28, 73 P.3d 947. Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 Ut.
104,990 P.2d 933, explained again the old rule that damages in a breach of contract
claim are to serve the important purpose of compensating an injured party for actual
injuries sustained so as that party may be restored, as near as possible to the
position he or she was in prior to the injury.
The fact that damages may be nominal is immaterial to the cause of action
accruing. Nominal damages are, in fact, available for breach of contract and the
statute of limitations begins to run on a contract breach even if the damages are not
ascertained. Clarke v. Living Scriptures, 2005 Ut. App. 225,114 P.3d 602.
III.

THE CAUSES OF ACTION HAVE ACCRUED
A.

Introduction.

The established facts in the record are that there was a contract - a lease between the plaintiffs and the defendant. That original contract provides that the
tenant may use the property for the removal and sale of the gravel, sand, soil, and
other aggregates on the premises. See Addendum "C", R. 323. There is no
provision authorizing the tenant/defendant to bring toxic substances onto the
property. Additionally, paragraph 2.3 of the lease provides that the lessee shall
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obtain all necessary permits and comply with all applicable statues, regulations and
orders or governmental bodies. (R. 311).
Other important facts include that toxic substances are verified to be on the
premises of the property and there is evidence produced that defendant brought
them onto the property during the leasehold interest. (R. 470 and 136,140).
B.

Breach of Contract.

Applying the elements of breach of contract outlined above, what the Plaintiffs
have to show in this action is that there was a contract with the Defendant whose
terms were breached with resulting damage. An examination of the facts in the
record shows that all of the elements have been met.
There is no reasonable dispute that the lease was in place between Cathy
Atkin and Patsy Atkin as lessors and McFarland & Hullinger, LLC as lessee. Patsy
Atkin has not been active in pursing the breach of contract.

Cathy Atkin, as a

lessor, has been very active.
With respect to the second element, whether there was a breach of the
contract, the existence of a breach is a question of fact for trial. Coalville City v.
Lundgren, 930 P.2d 1206 (Utah App. 1997). The record here clearly raises
questions of fact as to the breach which sh

reserved for trial. First, a large

amount of toxic substances have been established by the Plaintiffs to be present in
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the gravel pit during their ownership.

Second, the appearance of the toxic

substances in the gravel pit raise an issue of whether laws were violated by the
lessee contrary to paragraph 2.3 of the lease.
Potential violations of law, which are questions of fact for trial, include 42
U.S.C. Section 6972 and 6973 and implementing regulations found in which prohibit
the operation of a hazardous waste treatment facility, including transportation
thereto, without an appropriate permit.

See Addendum "D". The Utah Code

prohibits in Sections 19-6-113,19-16-821, and 19-6-112 unpermitted transportation
and storage

of toxic and solid waste.

See Addendum "E". The state has

implementing regulations in the Utah Administrative Code including R315-8-2
concerning failure to comply with preparedness and prevention requirements of
R315-8.3 concerning waste handling, failure to provide contingency and emergency
planning under R315-8-4, failure to protect ground water under R315-8-6, failure to
provide notices, do general waste analysis and provide training required by R315-8-2
and violation of closure and post-closure requirements of waste facilities under
R315-8-7. Also potentially at issue for violations of solid waste permitting and
management expressed in Utah Administrative Code R315-8-1 thru 320 and the
illegal disposal of undocumented waste prohibited by R315-301-3 including the
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operation of a solid waste facility without a permit in compliance with R315-301-5.
See Addendum "E".
Because Ms. Atkin and Mr. Eleopulos were owners, they have become
exposed to personal liability for cleanup costs under federal law. See 42 U.S.C. §
6972(a)(1 )(B) in Addendum "D". This liability for cleanup costs that may be ordered
by the federal government is not abstract. That is, when the toxic substances were
brought onto the property during the period of ownership of Ms. Atkin and Mr.
Eleopulos both became immediately liable personally as owners of the property
during the time of pollution. Also, the land itself was stigmatized by the placement
of a very large quantity of toxic substances.
The ruling of the court to the effect that damages had not accrued is
analogous to arguing that because one has a dented automobile from an automobile
accident there are no damages because the cost of repair had not been incurred.
In fact, the damages were incurred as of the moment of impact. The Utah courts
appear not to have yet spoken to the issue, but the Supreme Court of Kansas in
Empire Manufacturing Company v. Empire Candle, Inc., 41 P.3d 798 (Kan. 2002),
recognized what it identified as a "general rule" that damages in an action for breach
of contract are to be measured as of the date of the breach. Keep in mind that the
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Utah case law, explained above, holds that the statute of limitations can begin to run
even before the amount of damages is ascertained for breach of contract.
When toxic substances were put on the land Ms. Atkin and Mr. Eleopulos
became potentially personally liable under federal environmental statutes for the
cleanup cost estimated to be at least $1.5 million. Also, the property had been
stigmatized, dented, if you will, at the moment the first truckload of pollution was
dumped on the property.
Utah allows in breach of contract claims recovery of general damages and
consequential damages which were reasonably foreseeable at the time the contract
was entered. Thurston v. Workers'Compensation Fund of Utah, 2003 Ut. App. 483,
83 P.3d 391. Consequently, there should have been a trial allowed here if Plaintiffs
can show they suffered some injury. Consequential damages here would be the
great cost of the scientific study done to determine what had been done to the gravel
pit and the resulting exposure for cleanup costs and even criminal prosecution
which were fixed by federal and state law as of the time the polluting material was
brought onto the land.
Finally, the amount and extent of damages are a question of fact for trial
beyond dispute. Judd v. Drezqa, 2004 Ut. 91,103 P.3d 135. The trial court should
not have granted summary judgment on the breach of contract claim where there
13

was sufficient factual evidence raised to allow Plaintiffs to show they had incurred
damages. In fact, the record suggests there are substantial damages incurred by
the Plaintiffs.
That the exposure of one to liability to a third party because of the acts of first
party can be the subject of damages is supported by Utah's recognition of the thirdparty tort rule. Under this rule, when the natural consequence of one's negligence
leads to a dispute with a third party, the party that has been brought into the dispute
may seek recovery from the party that caused them to be involved. Tolman v.
Windchester Hills Water Company, Inc., 912 P.2d 457 (Utah App. 1996). It is not
a conceptual stretch from that established tort principle to finding an accrual of a
federal claim against the Plaintiffs here to be real injury for which compensation
should be made.
In summary, the record is clear that all of the elements of breach of contract
were present as of the time the complaint in this action was filed. First, there was
a contract in place in the form of a lease. Second, the tenant had breached the
lease by bringing toxic substances on the property contrary to the agreement to use
the property only for the removal of gravel and related materials. Also, the provision
of the lease requiring conformance of state and federal law had apparently been
breached with a gross violation of environmental law.
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Finally, damages were

incurred in that the property was stigmatized while under the ownership of Atkin, tens
of thousands of dollars was spent analyzing the problem by Atkin and Eleopulos and
they had become personally liable for at least $1.5 million in cleanup costs.
The district court clearly erred in concluding that the cause of action for breach
of contract had not accrued because of lack of damages. The subsequent partition
is irrelevant as damages accrue at the time of breach.
C.

The Waste Action Accrued.

The elements of a cause of action for waste were clearly established in
Oquirrh Associates v. First National Leasing Company, Inc., 888 P.2d 659 (Utah
App. 1994). This court explained there are three essential elements to establish a
claim for waste caused by a lessee. The first element is that there must be an act
constituting waste. This is an act of destruction, misuse, alteration or neglect of the
premises. The act must be done by one legally in possession. Third, the act must
prejudice the estate or interest in the estate of another. All of those elements are
present here.
As with the breach of contract analysis given above an examination of each
of the elements of a cause of action for waste shows that there are material facts for
trial resolution.
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The first element of an act constituting waste is present by the bringing of
hundreds of truckloads of toxic materials onto the property. This results in a cleanup
cost of some $1.5 million. This act of waste has attached potential liability exposure
for cleanup to Plaintiffs. What was brought on the land and by whom is clearly an
issue of fact.
Second, there can be no serious issue that the element of the waste being
done by one legally in possession applies here where the Defendant has had a
written lease to occupy the property. There has been no issue in the trial court or
here that Defendant had a right of possession of the gravel pit. The issue has been
whether that right to use the gravel pit for the extraction of gravel has been abused.
Finally, the act must prejudice the estate of another is found in the polluting
activity taking place before the partition of the property while it was owned by the
Plaintiffs.
The argument of the Defendant in the trial court that there was no damages,
adopted by the court, really fails of its own weight. The thrust of the argument is to
say that if a property which suffered waste is conveyed before the owner has a
chance to address the waste the obligation to that owner has somehow been
scrubbed or eliminated. The partition affects not at all the federal environmental
cleanup exposure of the Plaintiffs for the polluting activity of their land. The damage
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to the land occurred when the toxic material was placed on the land. The action for
waste had accrued long before the partition order.
The district court's ruling confuses the amount of damages with whether
damages have been incurred at all. Defendant is certainly free to argue at trial that
the partition may cutoff the damages of these Plaintiffs but there can be no real
disagreement that the bringing of polluted material onto the land affected the value
of the interest of the land while Plaintiffs owned it and caused the Plaintiffs to have
exposure for the cleanup costs that may be ordered by government.
In summary, there have been facts established which, if accepted at trial,
would affirm liability in the Defendant for waste conducted on the Plaintiffs' property
which affect the Plaintiffs long after they leave ownership of the property.
CONCLUSION
This court is no doubt well aware that it is not necessary to decide the merits
of the claims on an appeal from summary judgment. What is at issue here is
whether there are material facts which are disputed and could be properly resolved
in a trial. This brief has shown that there are.
The ruling of the district court was focused solely on damages. The other
elements of the causes of action are really not disputed. That is, no one disputes
that a lease was in place, that the defendant had possession of the property for
17

many years, and that there is a huge pile of toxic and solid waste on the property
that will take at least $1.5 million to cleanup. The only element at issue here is
whether there are arguable legally recognized damages.
This brief has shown that both causes of action for breach of contract and
waste accrued during the ownership of the Plaintiffs/Appellants and that their
damages are significant. They have become personally liable civilly and, potentially,
criminally, for these toxic materials being on the property. They have personally
incurred tens of thousands of dollars in scientific studies so as to establish the
wrongdoing of the lessee. All of this exposure to liability is consequential damage
that flows naturally from the nature of the breach and waste which occurred.
This court is respectfully requested to reverse the district court and reinstate
the causes of action for breach of contract and waste against the Defendant so that
they might proceed to trial.
DATED this l2**> day of August, 2005.
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.

GREG^R^^ANDERS
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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ADDENDUM

A

ADDENDUM "A"
Minute Entry and Formal Order Granting Motion

A-1

ft'A

M U D DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

FEB - 7 2005
TOOELE COUNTY

By.
Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THOMAS ELEOPULOUS and
CATHY ATKIN,
Plaintiff,

MINUTE ENTRY and
ORDER M MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
Case no. 010301120
McFARLAND AND HULLINGER, LLC
and DOES I-X,
Defendants.

Judge RANDALL N. SKANCHY

This Court, having heard argument Defendant McFarland and Hullinger's (Defendant)
Motion for Summary Judgment on February 2, 2005, with P. Bruce Badger and Rosemary Beless
appearing on behalf of Defendant and Gregory T. Sanders appearing on behalf of Plaintiffs
Thomas Eleopulous and Cathy Atkin (Plaintiffs) and having received and reviewed briefs in the
matter, finds and orders as follows:
1)

Plaintiffs' claim for trespass is dismissed as Plaintiffs have voluntarily abandoned

that claim.
2)

Plaintiffs claims for breach of contract and waste are likewise dismissed without

prejudice. The Court bases its dismissal of these claims on the following undisputed facts:
a)

Cathy Atkins and her sister, Patsy Atkins, received an interest in the subject
property ("Gravel Pit property") as beneficiaries of the Morley T. Atkin
Trust. The Gravel Pit property was part of a larger parcel of property the
sisters received from this Trust.

A-s

00523

b)

The Defendants leased the Gravel Pit property during the sisters joint
interest in the property. Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants breached the
lease and committed acts constituting waste on the Gravel Pit property.

c)

Cathy and Patsy Atkin were adverse parties to a partition actionfiledin the
Third Judicial District Court in and for Tooele County entitled Patsy Atkin
v. Cathy Atkin, civil no. 020300249. On or about Sepetember 23, 2003,
the larger parcel of property was partitioned pursuant to a trial.
Thereafter, on March 1, 2004, this Court entered an Order partitioning the
property, which Order granted Patsy Atkin the Gravel Pit Propertyfreeand
clear of any lien, right or obligation to Cathy Atkin. This ruling was
consistent with the expressed desire of Cathy Atkin as to which parcel of
the larger parcel she desired. Atkin and co-plaintiff, Eleopulous, have no
ownership interest in the Gravel Pit property. There was no evidence that
Patsy Atkin incurred a dimunition in value when the larger parcel was
partitioned.

d)

No action or order by any private, local, state or federal entity has been
instituted for clean-up of the Gravel Pit property and Cathy Atkin has not
been sued or named as a party responsible for clean-up action as to the
Gravel Pit property.

3)

A breach of contract claim requires four essential elements of proof, one of which

is damages. Breach of contract damages seek to place the aggrieved party in the same economic
position she would have had if the contract was not breached. Mahmoodv. Ross, 990 P.2d 933
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER

2
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(Utah 1999). Similarly, a waste claim requires three elements of proo£ one of which is prejudice
to the estate or interest of another. Waste damages may be measured by the either the cost of
restoration or the difference in market value before and after the injury. Dugan v. Jones, 724
P.2d 955 (Utah 1986).
4)

Even assuming for purposes of this motion for summary judgment that the

Defendant breached the contract and/or committed acts constituting waste, to defeat summary
judgment, the Plaintiffs must show damage and/or prejudice to their interest in the Gravel Pit
property. Here, the Plaintiffs fail to show any genuine issue of material fact regarding damages or
prejudice to their interest. The Plaintiffs have suffered no economic loss from the Defendant's
breach. While damages may occur in the future if the Plaintiffs are held liable for clean-up costs
or otherwise, presently no such damages exist, and as such neither their breach of contract nor
waste claims are ripe for adjudication. Nelson v. Nelson, 97 P.3d 722 (Utah 2004). While there
may have been a difference in market value before and after the injury, such dimunition in value of
the larger parcel was not raised by Plaintiffs as damage. Furthermore, Cathy chose not to keep
the portion of the larger parcel that included the Gravel Pit property, therefore, she will not bear
the burden of the dimunition in value of the property, if any.
ORDER
The Court GRANTS the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and ORDERS:
1)

the Plaintiffs' trespass claim DISMISSED with prejudice; and

2)

the Plaintiffs' breach of contract and waste claims DISMISSED without prejudice;

3)

the Defendants Counsel to prepare an Order for this Court to sign reflecting this
Minute Entry and Order.

MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER
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DATED this ^ _ day of February, 2005.
By, the Court:

MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER
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Rosemary J. Beless (A0272)
P. Bruce Badger (A4791)
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
A Professional Corporation
215 South State Street, 12th Floor
P.O. Box 510210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151
Telephone: (801)531-8900
Facsimile: (801)531-1716
Attorneys for Defendant McFarland & Hullinger, LC

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THOMAS ELEOPULOUS and CATHY
ATKJN,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
McFARLAND AND HULLINGER, LLC
and DOES I-X„

)
)
;
]
)
)1
]

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Civil No. 010301120
Judge Randall Skanchy

Defendants.
Defendant McFarland and Hullinger, LC's Motion for Summary Judgment came on for
hearing on February 2, 2005. Plaintiffs were represented by their counsel, Gregory J. Sanders.
Defendant McFarland and Hullinger, LC was represented by its counsel, P. Bruce Badger and
Rosemary J. Beless. The Court having read and considered the supporting and opposing motion
papers, and having heard argument of counsel, and being otherwise fiilly advised, now enters its
Order consistent with its Minute Entry and Order on Motion for Summary Judgment dated
February 7,2005.

334.79J.DOC
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted:
1.

Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action for breach of contract is dismissed without

2.

Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action for waste is dismissed without prejudice;

3.

Plaintiffs' Fifth Cause of Action for trespass is dismissed with prejudice.

prejudice;

DATED this ^ K

day of _

f W>

T

_, 2005

BY THE COURT:

Honorable Randall i . Skanchy
Third District CourT1Approved as to form:

Gregor^^^J/^feiders
Kipp and Christian
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Thomas Eleopulous
and Cathy Atkin

334179-1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On the

day of February 2005,1 hereby certify that I caused to be served a true and

correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, by depositing said document in the United States mail, postage
prepaid, addressed as follows:
Gregory J. Sanders
Margaret R. Wakeham
Kipp and Christian, P.C.
10 Exchange Place, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM "B"
Order re: Partition

A- II
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•..ri-iu'Jti-E
JOSEPH F . O R I F I C I (No. 6956)
4625 S o u t h 2300 E a s t , S u i t e 211
H o l l a d a y , UT 84117
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 272-2373
F a c s i m i l e : (801) 424-9137
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PATSY ATKIN,
Plaintiff,

AMENDED
ORDER OF PARTITION

Defendant,

Civil No. 000300249
Judge Randall Skanchy

vs.
CATHY ATKIN,

DIANE CASTAGNO,
Indispensable Party.

)

This matter came before the Court for trial on
September 26, 2003.

The parties and their counsel were present.

Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court
hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES as follows:
1.

Plaintiff and Defendant own approximately 250 acres

of real estate and 8 mining claims in Tooele County, Utah. The
land and mining claims were an inheritance from the parties'
father, Morley T. Atkin.

The property is more particularly

described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto.
2.

The Court finds that no formal survey has been

completed on any of the property.
3.

The Court orders that the property be divided as

A'U
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proposed by Plaintiff in trial exhibit no. 6.
4.

The Court orders the property fronting Highway 36

to be divided along north-south lines, each parcel to receive
equal frontage to Highway 36.
5.

The Court orders that Plaintiff receive the south

end of the highway frontage property which encompasses the gravel
pit area.

The Court orders that the Defendant to receive the

north side of the highway frontage where she presently resides.
In addition, Defendant shall receive the 2-1/2 acre parcel at the
north tip of the property which is zoned for residential
development.
6.

The Court finds that Plaintiff's proposal (Exhibit

6) is equitable with respect to the division of the Foothill
Property.

The Court places weight on the testimony given by Dick

Wood who actually observed the topography of the Foothill
Property.

The Court reserves the right to revisit the Foothill

Property partition if necessary.
7.

The Court orders that the Settlement Canyon

Property (Mountain Property) be divided equally.

The Court

reserves the issue of whether an exchange of mining claims for
the Mountain Property is equitable.
8.

The Court orders that the parties' mining claims be

divided equally.

The Court reserves the issue of whether the

mining claims would offset the value of the Settlement Canyon
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Property (Mountain Property) to determine if there is a more
equitable way to divide the Settlement Canyon Property.
9.

The Court orders it reserves the issue of access to

Plaintiff's property through an easement on Defendant's property
to the existing trail which leads to the mining claims until such
time as a certified survey is completed.
10.

The Court orders each party to provide the other

with an accounting of all money paid to improve and/or maintain
the property being divided so that the Court can determine
whether a monetary award is appropriate to either party.
11.

The Court orders that it is reasonable and

necessary for both parties to have equal water.
12.

The Court orders both parties to do anything

necessary to effectuate the partition of the property and water
rights ordered by this Court, including executing titles to any
trailers and/or mobile homes or other documents.

The Court

orders that any removal of the parties' property be accomplished
in a manner that does not damage existing fixtures.
13.

The Court orders the parties to obtain a formal

survey of the property with a division as set forth herein.

Each

party is ordered to pay one-half of the expense of obtaining such
survey.
14.

The Court orders that each party receive a right

of first refusal on the sale of the property divided by this
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Order of Partition.
15.

The Court orders that its Order of Partition

resolves all issues between the parties and Tom Eleopolus,
including any contempt proceedings.
DATED this

\

day of jijapr^raryi 2004
BY T H B ^ C C O R O F

*.4>

Rarfflai: _______

JOOBS.

NOTICE OF MAILING
I mailed a copy of the foregoing Amended Order of
Partition, postage prepaid, this %Q day of February, 2004,
addressed as follows:
Wesley M. Lang, Esq.
POWELL & LANG
50 South Main #850
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Attorney for Defendant
Cathy Atkin
22575 South Highway 36
Tooele, UT 84074
Diane Castagno
P.O. Box 39
Tooele, UT 84074

-Moris'

LegaJL/Assistant
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EXHIBIT "A"
DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY
Gravel Pit Property
A.

Parcel 06-007-A-OOOl containing approx. 2.488 acres.

B.

Parcel 06-008-0-0008 containing approx. 146.50 acr.es.

The Foothill Property
A.

Parcel 06-009-0-008 containing approximately 51 acres.

The Mountain Property
A.

Parcel 06-012-0-009 containing approx. 26.67 acres.

Mining Claims
A.

Two (2) clusters of four (4) mining claims.

Ml
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ADDENDUM "C"
Lease Between the Parties

A-H

A' 90

LEASE AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into this 2nd day
of January, 1992, by and between the MORLEY T. ATKIN Trust,
hereinafter referred to as LESSOR, and McFarland and Hullinqer
whose address is:

915 North Main Street, P.Q. Box 238, Tooele,

V}tfrh 4ftfrl4 Vtex<iiTk*£t« x^ierred to 9>s LESSEE*.

WITNESSETH:
ONE:

DEMISE OF PREMISES.

The LESSOR, for and in

consideration of the provisions of this Lease, hereby grants
and leases unto the LESSEE, AND LESSEE hereby takes from LESSOR,
the exclusive rights and privileges described in paragraph
Two hereof, with respect to the land of the LESSOR located
in Tooele County, State of Utah, and more particularly described
as follows:
An area approximately 60 acres in size located
adjacent to the Southeast side of State Road 36,
and within the following described parcel:
Beginning at the Northeast Corner of Section 1,
T4S, R4W# SLB&M, and running thence West 450
feet; thence 36 45* West 700 feet; thence South
43 15* East 466.69 feet; thence South 36 45'
West 466-69 feet; thence North 43 45* West 320
feet; thence South along the southeast boundary
of SR 36f 1,470 feet, then East along the quarter
section line 1,320 feet to the eastern boundary
of said section; thence North 2,640 feet along
said boundary line to the point of beginning.
Said 60 acres presently being developed as a site
for the removal of aggregates.
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TWO:

USES:

Except as set forth in paragraph 2.2,

LESSEE shall have the exclusive right and privilege with respect
to all gravel, sand, soil and other aggregates located in, upon
or under the Leased Premises, (hereinafter referred to as aggregates):
a.

To explore for, remove, take, produce, process,

extract and sell the leased aggregates.
b.

To construct/ operate and maintain on the

Leased Premises all trenches, works, buildings, plants, structures,
appliances, and equipment necessary to the aforesaid uses and
for the custom processing of materials from other locations.
c.

To use the Leased Premises for any other

use reasonably incident to the uses described in this paragraph.
2.2

Lessor's Reserved Rights and Uses.

LESSOR reserves

to himself and his successor's and assigns:
a.

The right to use the Leased Premises for

all uses not granted to LESSEE hereunder, provided that such
uses by LESSOR do not interfere with LESSEE'S use or permissible
intended uses of the Leased Premises; and further provided that
LESSEE shall not be required to Lake any steps or to spend any
money to prevent such interferences with Lessee; and
b.

The right to all oil, gas, and other hydrocarbons

found or present *upon, in or under the Leased Premises, the
same not being included in the Leased Premises or the leased
aggregates.
2.3,

Compliance with Laws.

LESSEE agrees during

the terra of this Lease/ at its expense, to obtain and maintain
in effect all necessary permits and to comply with all applicable,
valid statutes, regulations and orders of all governmental bodies
having jurisdiction over LESSEE or the Leased Premises.

M*
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THREE:

TERM.

The term of this Lease shall be for

nine years and six months
January

commencing on the second day of

, 19 92 , and ending on the

30th

day of

June,

20 01 , and it is understood, that if during this lease period,
the trust elects to sell the 60 acres under lease, McFarland and
Hullinger is granted the right of first refusal to purchase such
60 acres.
The Lessee shall pay unto the LESSOR the following rental payments:
Land rental of $200 per month plus 25C per ton for small amounts
of aggregates or at a negotiated rate per ton or yard for largo
projects; such negotiated rate(s) will be made a matter of
written agreement between the LESSEE AND LESSOR.
4.2.

LESSOR'S right to purchase aggregates.

During

the term of this Lease, LESSOR may at any time purchase from LESSEE
any aggregates produced, extracted, processed or stored upon the
Leased Premises, at the then current fair market price of said
aggregates.
FIVE:

DETERMINING PRODUCTION.

LESSEE shall furnish

to the LESSOR on or before the fifth day of the month of each
month after the first month of this Lease, copies of all weight
slips or weight lists for aggregates removed from the Leased Premises.
LESSOR shall also have the right to inspect the books of LESSEE
l

either personally or by designated representatives, the same to
be open and available to said persons during normal working hours
and days at LESSEE'S regular place of business, and LESSEE shall
provide copies of said records upon request of LESSOR, the cost
of making said copies to be paid by LESSOR at the rate of ten
cents per page.

To the extent possible, LESSEE'S records shall

be in a form which provides information with respect to the Leased
Premises separately from other property operated by LESSEE.

They

will include the location and results of exploration openings,
the character of formations and the analysis of minerals encountered
on the Leased Premises.

LESSEE will furnish LESSOR with a copy

of such information upon completion of or the abandonment of any
exploration, together with a true copy of all surface and subsurface
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surveys made of the Leased premises.

LESSEE shall give LESSOR

access to all facilities owned or used by it for making such observation
measurements and records as LESSOR may desire.
SIX:

OPERATION OF THE LEASED PREMISES.

LESSEE shall work the

Leased Premises diligently and efficiently, in accordance with good
engineering practices, and in a workmanlike manner.

Overburden will

be removed at least twenty feet in advance of aggregate removal.
All worked areas will be contoured so as to blend in a sightly and
safe manner with adjoining worked areas and adjoining property.
piles will be kept clean of debris, and shall be kept level.

Stock

LESSEE

shall be responsible to survey and stake the boundaries of the Leased
Premises and to so work the area adjacent to adjoinging premises so as
to prevent the sloughing of soil or the undermining of the adjoining
premises.

All fences, utility appurtenances and other surface or

subsurface objects upon the leased premises shall be protected by
adequate and proper supports and the soil shall not be removed for
at least five feet on any side of any utility appurtenance.

All damage

to fences, gates, utility appurtenances, and other objects upon the
leased premises shall be repaired or replaced to their original condition
at the cost and expense of LESSEE.
6.2.

LESSOR shall have no obligations to make any repairs or to

incur any expense whatsoever in connection with the Leased Premises.
SEVEN:

IMJEJSL-

LESSOR shall be responsible for the payment of

all real property taxes assessed for the premises by the Tooele County
Assessor.
7.2.

PERSONAL PROPERTY and MINING PROPERTY TAXES. SALES TAXES.

The LESSEE shall be responsible for all taxes upon personal property
owned, used or leased by it upon the Leased Premises.

It shall also

be responsible for all Mining taxes assessed by the State of Utah, and
all sales taxes for the sales of aggregates removed from the premises.
LESSOR shall be entitled to receive copies of all returns prepared by
LESSEE in reporting taxes for which it is responsible as provide by
this paragraph.

f\-V\
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7.3.

LESSEE shall not permit any part of the Leased Premises

to be sold for delinquent tax assessments against its property or
for which it is responsible.
7.4.

LESSEE shall not be liable for taxes and assessments which

are assessed and levied on the interests and rights reserved to LESSOR
under this Lease.

LESSEE shall not be obligated to pay any franchise,

corporate, estate or transfer tax of the LESSOR or any income tax upon
the LESSOR'S income, or any other tax upon the rent payable under this
Lease.
EIGHT:

INSURANCE COVERAGE.

Throughout the term of this Lease,

LESSEE shall, at its cost and expense, maintain and keep in force
with respect to the Leased Premises, comrehensive general public,
liability insurance, naming LESSOR as an additional insured, in amounts
not less than the combined single limit of Five Hundred Thousand Dollars
for personal injury or death to all persons in any one occurrence and
Two Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars for damage to property.

Such

insurance shall be written by companies of recognized financial standing
authorized to do business in the State of Utah.

The policies shall

contain a provision that they cannot be cancelled except upon fifteen
days' prior notice to the LESSOR.
8.2.

Evidence of Coverage.

LESSEE shall deliver to LESSOR

certificates or duplicate originals of such policies, together with
evidence of payments of the premiums thereon, and shall deliver renewal
policies or binders prior to the expiration of any existing policy.
8.3.

Workman's Compensation, other insurance.

LESSEE shall

maintain workman's compensation and such other insurance as may be
required by law or agreement for all persons working for or under
LESSEE upon the Leased Premises.

LESSOR shall not be responsible for

any expense Incurred by any person upon the Leased Premises during the
term of this agreement.

fi'K
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NINE:

MECHANIC'S LIENS. LESSOR shall not be liable for any labor

or materials furnished to LESSEE on credit and no mechanic's or other
lien for any such labor or mateirals shall attach to or affect the
interest of LESSOR in and to the Leased Premises.

If a mechanic's

lien is filed against the Leased Premises, LESSEE shall, within 30 days
after notice to the LESSEE, take such action by bonding, deposit or
payment, as will remove or satisfy the lien.

If LESSEE shall fail

to remove the same within said period, LESSOR may pay such amounts and
take such actions as may be necessary to remove or satisfy the lien
and LESSEE shall reimburse LESSOR for all reasonable costs and expenses
including reasonable attorney's fees incurred by LESSOR in connection
therewith.
TEN:

EMINENT DOMAIN.

If a substantial portion of the Leased

Premises shall be taken by virture of eminent domain or for any public
or quasi-public use which renders the use of the remainder of the
Leased Premises by Lessee uneconomical, then Lessee may, by notice
to Lessor, terminate this Lease effective upon the taking of actual
possession by the condemning authority.

Within 30 days after such

termination, LESSOR shall refund to LESSEE any rental payments covering
land so taken prepaid by LESSEE for a period after the date of terminatio
10.2.

Condemnation Award.

LESSEE shall be entitled to prosecute

or defend against a claim for and to receive from a condemnation award
a sum equal to the fair market value of LESSEE'S improvements on the
Leased Premises and of LESSEE'S leasehold estate in the Leased Premises.
LESSOR shall be entitled to claim and to receiv the balance of
the award.

LESSOR may also prosecute or defend an action for condemnatioi

for his own rights in the leased premises, and shall be entitled to
the award for said rights.
ELEVEN:

DEFAULT.

In the event of a failure to comply with the

terms hereof by the LESSEE, or upon failure of the LESSEE to make any
payment or payments of rent when the same shall become due, or within
five days thereafter, the LESSOR shall at his option have the following
remedies:
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(a)

LESSOR shall have the right, upon failure of the LESSEE

to remedy the default within five days after written notice, or if the
breach is such that it cannot be fully rectified within said five day
period, should the LESSEE fail to take substantial steps to the accomplls
ment of the correction of the breach, the LESSOR may serve upon the
LESSEE by Certified Mail at its address given above, a notice of terminat
of this Lease, and all rental payments made in advance for the term
hereof, shall be forfeited as liquidated damages for said breach.
LESSEE agrees that LESSOR may re-enter the premises and take possession
of the same and all property of the LESSEE thereon, without legal
process or further notice, and LESSEE shall immediately become a
tenant at will of the LESSOR.
(b)

LESSOR may bring suit to collect all damages, delinquent

rent, and other costs, including attorney's fees incurred by the
LESSOR'S

breach or delinquency.

(c)

The use of one or the other of said remedies on one or

more occassions, does not prevent the use of the other remedy on
subsequent occassions.
11.2.

Interest on Lale Payments. LESSEE shall pay LESSOR

interest at the rate of 18* per annmn upon all amounts due to LESSOR
which are unpaid for more than fifteen days after their due date,
computed from the due date until the date of payment, both before and
after judgment.
11.3.

Lessee's Bankruptcy.

If LESSEE is adjudicated a

bankrupt, or shall make an assignment for the benefit of creditors, or
file a voluntary petition under any law having for its purpose the
adjudication of Lessee as a bankrupt, or the extension of time of
payment, composition, adjustment, modification, settlement or
satisfaction of the liabilities of LESSEE, or if a receiver is appointed
for the property of LESSEE by reason of the insolvency of LESSEE,
notwithstanding anything to the contrary elsewhere in this Lease, this
Lease shall immediately terminate and be of no further force or effect,

kr\
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and LESSEE shall be immediately have the right of re-entry and possessic
of the premises, without notice to LESSEE, and LESSEE shall for all
purposes be considered a tenant at will.
TWELVE:

FORCE MAJEURE,

LESSEE and LESSOR shall not be liable

for any failure or delay in performing any obligation hereunder, other
than the payment of money, caused by or resulting from strike, lockout
or other industrial disturbance, war, fire, earthquake, explosion,
flood, storm, act of God, accident, mandatory or voluntary regulations,
rules or orders Issued or requested by any governmental agency; inabilit;
to operate except at a loss due to prevailing market conditions;
curtailment or inability to obtain sufficient labor or utilities;
breakdown of machinery or equipment; interruption of transportation
facilities or any other cause whatsoever (whether or not of the same
class or kind as those set forth above) beyond their reasonable control
affecting them or any of their suppliers (herein called "force majeure")•
No party shall have any obligation to contest any governmental action,
regulation, rule or order or to make any concession or grant any demand
or request in order to bring to an end any strikes or other concerted
act of workmen, or to expend any sums to avoid the effect of force
majeure.
THIRTEEN:

SURRENDER OF POSSESSION,

At the expiration or

prior to termination of this Lease, LESSEE shall surrender to LESSOR
peaceable possession of the Leased Premises in such condition as may
be required by good mining and engineering practies and by applicable
laws, regulations and orders of all governmental agencies having
Jurisdiction over the Leased Premises.

If LESSEE fails to leave

the Leased Premises in such condition, after 30 days1 notice to LESSEE
specifying the condition objected to by LESSOR, and giving LESSEE an
opportunity to remedy such condition, LESSOR may take such action as may
be reasonably necessary to put the Leased Premises into the condition
required by this paragraph, and LESSEE shall be liable to LESSOR for the
reasonable expense thereof.

This provision shall survive the expiration

or termination of this Lease, notwithstanding any other provision to
the contrary.
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^3.2.

Lessee's Property.

Within 90 days after the expiration

or prior termination of this Lease, LESSEE shall remove from the
Leased Premises

all its equipment and property located thereon.

If LESSEE fails to remove the same, unless the same has been attached
by legal process of LESSOR, within the time provided, it shall become the
property of the LESSOR.

LESSOR may thereafter remove the same and LESSEE

shall be liable to LESSOR for the reasonable expenses incurred by
LESSOR in connection therewith.
FOURTEEN:

QUIET ENJOYMENT.

LESSOR warrants that he has the

right to lease to LESSEE the rights and privilges set forth herein
and LESSOR covenants and agrees that if and so long as LESSEE shall
perform and observe all of the terms, conditions, covenants, and
provisions of this Lease, which LESSEE is to perform and observe,
LESSEE shall lawfully and quietly have, hold and enjoy the exclusive
rights and privileges.
FIFTEEN:
15.1.

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS.

Prohibition of Assignment and Subletting.

LESSEE may

not assign or sublet this Lease or any part of the Leased Premises
without the written consent of the LESSOR first had and obtained,
which consent LESSON, agrees not to unreasonably withhold.
15.2.

Notice.

All notices required or permitted hereunder shall

be in writing and delivered by certified mail, postage prepaid, addressed
to the parties at their address set forth above for LESSEE, and to
LESSOR at 623 East Crestview Drive, Tooele, Utah 84074, or to such other
addresses as either party shall have designated to the other by notice.
The date of giving notice by mail shall be the date of mailing shown on
the envelope.
15.3.

Waiver,*

No delay or failure on either party's part to

enforce any right or claim which it may have hereunder shall constitute
a waiver on such party's part of such right or claim.

Any waiver by

either party of any term, provisions or condition hereof or of any
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or of any default hereunder in any one or more instances shall not
be deemed to be a further or continuing waiver of such term, provision,
or condition or of any subsequent default hereunder.
15.4.

Paragraph Headings.

Paragraph headings are for reference

only, and do not affect the meaning of any paragraph.
15.5.

No Modification*

This Lease represents the entire under-

standing of the parties with reBpect to its subject matter, and no
term, condition, negotiation or provision not contained herein is of
any force or effect whatsoever.

This Lease may not be changed orally,

but only by an agreement in writing signed by the party against whom
enforcement is sought.
15.6.

Successors and lyssigns.

The covenants and agreements

contained in this Lease sliall apply to, inure to the benefit of, and be
binding upon the parties hereto, and upon their respective successors,
permitted assigns, heirs, executors and administrators or personal
representatives, except as otherwise hereinbefore provided.
15.7.

Attorney's fees.

Any party breaching this Lease shall

pay the reasonable attorney's fees of the aggrieved party, and all
court costs or other reasonable charges incurred in obtaining a
remedy and satisfaction.
15.8.

Severance.

If any provision of this Lease is held

Invalid, the remaining terms, paragraphs and provisions shall remain
in full force and effect.
WITNESS the hands of the parties hereto the date first above
written.
LESSOR:

*6^K<? / ^ 7 ^
Mocley T. Atkin Trust
Lois Atkin, Trustee

frW
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Federal Environmental Statutes
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Page 1
42 U.S.C.A. § 6973

(a) Authority of Administrator
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, upon receipt of evidence that the past or present handling, storage,
treatment, transportation or disposal of any solid waste or hazardous waste may present an imminent and substantial
endangerment to health or the environment, the Administrator may bring suit on behalf of the United States in the
appropriate district court against any person (including any past or present generator, past or present transporter, or past
or present owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or disposal facility) who has contributed or who is contributing to
such handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal to restrain such person from such handling, storage,
treatment, transportation, or disposal, to order such person to take such other action as may be necessary, or both. A
transporter shall not be deemed to have contributed or to be contributing to such handling, storage, treatment, or disposal
taking place after such solid waste or hazardous waste has left the possession or control of such transporter if the
transportation of such waste was under a sole contractural fFNH arrangement arising from a published tariff and
acceptance for carriage by common carrier by rail and such transporter has exercised due care in the past or present
handling, storage, treatment, transportation and disposal of such waste. The Administrator shall provide notice to the
affected State of any such suit. The Administrator may also, after notice to the affected State, take other action under
this section including, but not limited to, issuing such orders as may be necessary to protect public health and the
environment.
(b) Violations
Any person who willfully violates, or fails or refuses to comply with, any order of the Administrator under subsection
(a) of this section may, in an action brought in the appropriate United States district court to enforce such order, be fined
not more than $5,000 for each day in which such violation occurs or such failure to comply continues.
(c) Immediate notice
Upon receipt of information that there is hazardous waste at any site which has presented an imminent and substantial
endangerment to human health or the environment, the Administrator shall provide immediate notice to the appropriate
local government agencies. In addition, the Administrator shall require notice of such endangerment to be promptly
posted at the site where the waste is located.
(d) Public participation in settlements
Whenever the United States or the Administrator proposes to covenant not to sue or to forbear from suit or to settle any
claim arising under this section, notice, and opportunity for a public meeting in the affected area, and a reasonable
opportunity to comment on the proposed settlement prior to its final entry shall be afforded to the public. The decision
of the United States or the Administrator to enter into or not to enter into such Consent Decree, covenant or agreement
shall not constitute a final agency action subject to judicial review under this chapter or chapter 7 of Title 5.
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(a) In general
Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of this section, any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf—
(1)(A) against any person (including (a) the United States, and (b) any other governmental instrumentality or agency,
to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of any permit,
standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order which has become effective pursuant to this chapter;
or
(B) against any person, including the United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency, to the extent
permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution, and including any past or present generator, past or present
transporter, or past or present owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or disposal facility, who has contributed or
who is contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or
hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment; or
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this
chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator.
Any action under paragraph (a)(1) of this subsection shall be brought in the district court for the district in which the
alleged violation occurred or the alleged endangerment may occur. Any action brought under paragraph (a)(2) of this
subsection may be brought in the district court for the district in which the alleged violation occurred or in the District
Court of the District of Columbia. The district court shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in controversy
or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce the permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order,
referred to in paragraph (1)(A), to restrain any person who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or present
handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste referred to in paragraph (1)(B),
to order such person to take such other action as may be necessary, or both, or to order the Administrator to perform the
act or duty referred to in paragraph (2), as the case may be, and to apply any appropriate civil penalties under section
6928(a) and £g] of this title.
(b) Actions prohibited
(1) No action may be commenced under subsection (a)(1)(A) of this section(A) prior to 60 days after the plaintiff has given notice of the violation to~
(i) the Administrator;
(ii) the State in which the alleged violation occurs; and
(iii) to any alleged violator of such permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order,
except that such action maybe brought immediately after such notification in the case of an action under this section
respecting a violation of subchapter III of this chapter; or
(B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of
the United States or a State to require compliance with such permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement,
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prohibition, or order.
In any action under subsection (a)(1)(A) of this section in a court of the United States, any person may intervene as a
matter of right.
(2)(A) No action may be commenced under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section prior to ninety days after the plaintiff
has given notice of the endangerment to~
(i) the Administrator;
(ii) the State in which the alleged endangerment may occur;
(iii) any person alleged to have contributed or to be contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment,
transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste referred to in subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section,
except that such action may be brought immediately after such notification in the case of an action under this section
respecting a violation of subchapter III of this chapter.
(B) No action may be commenced under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section if the Administrator, in order to restrain or
abate acts or conditions which may have contributed or are contributing to the activities which may present the alleged
endangerment—
(i) has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action under section 6973 of this title or under section 106 of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 f42 U.S.C.A. § 9606L rFNll
(ii) is actually engaging in a removal action under section 104 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 [42 U.S.C.A. § 96041;
(iii) has incurred costs to initiate a Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study under section 104 of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 f42 U.S.C.A. § 96041 and is
diligently proceeding with a remedial action under that Act f42 U.S.C.A. $ 9601 et seq.]; or
(iv) has obtained a court order (including a consent decree) or issued an administrative order under section 106 of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 980 rFN21 f42 U.S.C.A. § 96061 or
section 6973 of this title pursuant to which a responsible party is diligently conducting a removal action, Remedial
Investigation and Feasibility Study (RIFS), or proceeding with a remedial action.
In the case of an administrative order referred to in clause (iv), actions under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section are
prohibited only as to the scope and duration of the administrative order referred to in clause (iv).
(C) No action may be commenced under subsection (a)( 1 )(B) of this section if the State, in order to restrain or abate acts
or conditions which may have contributed or are contributing to the activities which may present the alleged
endangerment(i) has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section;
(ii) is actually engaging in a removal action under section 104 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
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Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 f42 U.S.C.A. § 96041; or
(iii) has incurred costs to initiate a Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study under section 104 of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 f42 U.S.C.A. § 96041 and is
diligently proceeding with a remedial action under that Act f42 U.S.C.A. § 9601 et seq.].
(D) No action may be commenced under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section by any person (other than a State or local
government) with respect to the siting of a hazardous waste treatment, storage, or a disposal facility, nor to restrain or
enjoin the issuance of a permit for such facility.
(E) In any action under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section in a court of the United States, any person may intervene as
a matter of right when the applicant claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and he is so situated that the
disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the
Administrator or the State shows that the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
(F) Whenever any action is brought under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section in a court of the United States, the plaintiff
shall serve a copy of the complaint on the Attorney General of the United States and with the Administrator.
(c) Notice
No action may be commenced under paragraph (a)(2) of this section prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice
to the Administrator that he will commence such action, except that such action may be brought immediately after such
notification in the case of an action under this section respecting a violation of subchapter III of this chapter. Notice
under this subsection shall be given in such manner as the Administrator shall prescribe by regulation. Any action
respecting a violation under this chapter may be brought under this section only in the judicial district in which such
alleged violation occurs.
(d) Intervention
In any action under this section the Administrator, if not a party, may intervene as a matter of right.
(e) Costs
The court, in issuing any final order in any action brought pursuant to this section or section 6976 of this title, may award
costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to the prevailing or substantially prevailing
party, whenever the court determines such an award is appropriate. The court may, if a temporary restraining order or
preliminary injunction is sought, require the filing of a bond or equivalent security in accordance with the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.
(f) Other rights preserved
Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or
common law to seek enforcement of any standard or requirement relating to the management of solid waste or hazardous
waste, or to seek any other relief (including relief against the Administrator or a State agency).
(g) Transporters
A transporter shall not be deemed to have contributed or to be contributing to the handling, storage, treatment, or
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disposal, referred to in subsection (a)( 1 )(B) of this section taking place after such solid waste or hazardous waste has left
the possession or control of such transporter, if the transportation of such waste was under a sole contractual arrangement
arising from a published tariff and acceptance for carriage by common carrier by rail and such transporter has exercised
due care in the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation and disposal of such waste.
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(1) Whenever the board determines that any person is in violation of any applicable
approved hazardous wastes operation plan or solid waste plan, the requirements of this
part, or any of the board's rules, it may cause written notice of that violation to be
served upon the alleged violator. The notice shall specify the provisions of the plan,
this part or rule alleged to have been violated, and the facts alleged to constitute
the violation.
(2) The board may:
(a) issue an order requiring that necessary corrective action be taken within a
reasonable time; or
(b) request the attorney general or the county attorney in the county in which the
violation is taking place to bring a civil action for injunctive relief and
enforcement of this part.
(3) Pending promulgation of rules for corrective action under Section 19-6- 105, the
board may issue corrective action orders on a case-by-case basis, as necessary to carry
out the purposes of this part.
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(1) As used in this section, "RCRA" means the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
42 U.S.C. Section 6901, et seq.
(2) Any person who violates any order, plan, rule, or other requirement issued or
adopted under this part is subject in a civil proceeding to a penalty of not more than
$13,000 per day for each day of violation.
(3) On or after July 1, 1990, no person shall knowingly:
(a) transport or cause to be transported any hazardous waste identified or listed
under this part to a facility that does not have a hazardous waste operation plan or
permit under this part or RCRA;
(b) treat, store, or dispose of any hazardous waste identified or listed under this
part:
(i) without having obtained a hazardous waste operation plan or permit as required
by this part or RCRA;
(ii) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of a hazardous
waste operation plan or permit; or
(iii) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of any rules or
regulations under this part or RCRA;
(c) omit material information or make any false material statement or representation
in any application, label, manifest, record, report, permit, operation plan, or other
document filed, maintained, or used for purposes of compliance with this part or RCRA
or any rules or regulations made under this part or RCRA; and
(d) transport or cause to be transported without a manifest, any hazardous waste
identified or listed under this part and required by rules or regulations made under
this part or RCRA to be accompanied by a manifest.
(4)(a)(i) Any person who knowingly violates any provision of Subsection (3)(a) or (b)
is guilty of a felony.
(ii) Notwithstanding Sections 76-3-203, 76-3-301, and 76-3-302, a person convicted
of a felony under Subsection (3) (a) or (b) is subject to a fine of not more than
$50,000 for each day of violation, or imprisonment for a term not to exceed five
years, or both.
(iii) If a person is convicted of a second or subsequent violation under Subsection
(3) (a) or (b) , the maximum punishment is double both the fine and the term of
imprisonment authorized in Subsection (4)(a)(ii).
(b) (i) Any person who knowingly violates any of the provisions of Subsection
or (d) is guilty of a felony.

(3) (c)

(ii) Notwithstanding Sections 76-3-203, 76-3-301, and 76-3-302, a person convicted
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of a felony for a violation of Subsection (3) (c) or (d) is subject to a fine of not
more than $50,000 for each day of violation, or imprisonment for a term not to
exceed two years, or both.
(iii) If a person is convicted of a second or subsequent violation under Subsection
(3)(c) or (d), the maximum punishment is double both the fine and the imprisonment
authorized in Subsection (4)(b)(ii).
(c)(i) Any person who knowingly transports, treats, stores, or disposes of any
hazardous waste identified or listed under this part in violation of Subsection
(3) (a), (b) , (c) , or (d) , who knows at that time that he thereby places another
person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury is guilty of a felony.
(ii) Notwithstanding Sections 76-3-203, 76-3-301, and 76-3-302, a person convicted
of a felony described in Subsection (4) (c) (i) is subject to a fine of not more than
$250,000 or imprisonment for a term not to exceed 15 years, or both.
(iii) A corporation, association, partnership, or governmental instrumentality, upon
conviction of violating Subsection (4) (c) (i) , is subject to a fine of not more than
$1,000,000.
(5) (a) Except as provided in Subsections (5) (b) and (c) and Section 19-6- 722, all
penalties assessed and collected under authority of this section shall be deposited in
the General Fund.
(b) The department may reimburse itself and local governments from monies collected
from civil penalties for qualifying extraordinary expenses incurred in qualifying
environmental enforcement activities.
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 78-3-14.5, the department may reimburse
itself and local governments from monies collected from criminal fines for qualifying
extraordinary expenses incurred in prosecutions for violations of this part.
(d) The department shall regulate reimbursements by making rules that define:
(i) qualifying environmental enforcement activities;

and

(ii) qualifying extraordinary expenses.
(6) Prosecution for criminal violations of this part may be commenced by the attorney
general, the county attorney, or the district attorney as appropriate under Section
17-18-1 or 17-18-1.7 in any county where venue is proper.
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(1) A person who violates any provision of this part or any order, permit, plan
approval, or rule issued or adopted under this part is subject to a civil penalty of
not more than $10,000 per day for each day of violation as determined in a civil
hearing under Title 63, Chapter 4 6b, Administrative Procedures Act, except:
(a) any violation of Subsection 19-6-804(1) or (3), regarding landfills, is subject
to the penalty under Subsection 19-6-804(4) rather than the penalties under this
section; and
(b) any violation of Subsection 19-6-808(1), (2), or (3) regarding payment of the
recycling fee by the tire retailer is subject to penalties as provided in Subsection
19-6-808(4) rather than the penalties under this section.
(2) The board may bring an action in the name of the state to restrain a person from
continuing a violation of this part and to require the person to perform necessary
remediation regarding a violation of this part.
(3) When the executive secretary finds a situation exists in violation of this part
that presents an immediate threat to the public health or welfare, the executive
secretary may issue an emergency order under Title 63, Chapter 4 6b, Administrative
Procedures Act.
(4) The executive secretary may revoke the registration of a waste tire recycler or
transporter who violates any provision of this part or any order, plan approval,
permit, or rule issued or adopted under this part.
(5) The executive secretary may revoke the tire storage permit for a storage facility
that is in violation of any provision of this part or any order, plan approval, permit,
or rule issued or adopted under this part.
(6) If a person has been convicted of violating a provision of this part prior to a
finding by the executive secretary of a violation of the same provision in an
administrative hearing, the executive secretary may not assess a civil monetary penalty
under this section for the same offense for which the conviction was obtained.
(7) All penalties collected under this section shall be deposited in the fund.

kAI

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the

day of August, 2005, two

true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT was mailed, first
class, postage pre-paid to the following:
Rosemary J. Beless
P. Bruce Badger
Fabian & Clendenin
215 South State Street, 12,h Floor
Post Office Box 510210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151

F \Cheryl\Atkin\Appeal\Brief.081105.wpd/cb

